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8 Abstract. In the past five years, there have been a series of papers in the journal Evolution debating
9 the relative significance of two theories of evolution, a neo-Fisherian and a neo-Wrightian theory,
10 where the neo-Fisherians make explicit appeal to parsimony. My aim in this paper is to determine
11 how we can make sense of such an appeal. One interpretation of parsimony takes it that a theory
12 that contains fewer entities or processes, (however we demarcate these) is more parsimonious. On
13 the account that I defend here, parsimony is a ‘local’ virtue. Scientists’ appeals to parsimony are not
14 necessarily an appeal to a theory’s simplicity in the sense of it’s positing fewer mechanisms. Rather,
15 parsimony may be proxy for greater probability or likelihood. I argue that the neo-Fisherians
16 appeal is best understood on this interpretation. And indeed, if we interpret parsimony as either
17 prior probability or likelihood, then we can make better sense of Coyne et al. argument that
18 Wright’s three phase process operates relatively infrequently.
19
20 Introduction
21 In 1914, Sturteyvant defended the view that linkage is best explained by the
22 hypothesis that genes are aligned on a chromosome, as opposed to a view
23 favored by Bateson and Castle, the ‘reduplication’ hypothesis.1 Summing up
24 his rationale, he wrote that ‘the chief advantage of the chromosome hypothesis
25 of linkage… seems to be its simplicity.’’ In retrospect, we know that Sturteyvant
26 was correct, but in this passage, his reasoning seems spurious. What does
27 Sturteyvant mean when he suggests that the chromosomal hypothesis is ‘sim-
28 pler’? Why does the greater simplicity of a hypothesis count as a reason that
29 favors it (perhaps defeasably) over its rival? Carlson, in his discussion of
30 Sturteyvan’ts rationale, is skeptical of the virtue of simplicity as grounds for
31 preferring one hypothesis to another, calling such appeals merely ‘aesthetic’
32 (Carlson 1966). Many philosophers have expressed similar skepticism.
33 This skepticism is often connected to a more general skepticism about the
34 simplicity of nature. Why assume that the hypothesis that admits the fewest
35 causes, entities, or processes, (however these are demarcated, and, all else being
36 equal) is the more likely to be true? It would seem that such a view presupposes
1 For details on the reduplication hypothesis, see Carlson, The Gene: A Critical History, 1966,
p. 56. (The details of the theory are not essential to understanding this example.)
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37 an ontological thesis. According to this thesis, we are to assume that nature is
38 in fact simple, or that the natural world is governed by simple laws, a few
39 fundamental forces, or, as Newton suggested, ‘Nature does nothing in vain,
40 and more is in vain where less will serve’ (Newton 1729). In other words, if we
41 assume that nature takes the shortest way, in every case where we are assessing
42 competing explanations for some set of phenomena, we ought to choose that
43 explanation which invokes fewer rather than more causes, entities, or pro-
44 cesses.
45 But such reasoning seems spurious. If one understands simplicity, or, par-
46 simony2 as economy of process, it is tempting to dismiss appeals to parsimony
47 by scientists, and especially appeals made by biologists. There seems to be no
48 principled reason why one ought to assume that the biological world is simple,
49 or that an explanation of that world which makes appeal to fewer entities or
50 processes is better. Indeed, in the biological realm, there seem to be good
51 reasons not to expect that nature will take ‘shortest way.’ Jacob (1977) and
52 Gould and Lewontin (1979) have taught us well that ‘nature is a tinkerer’;
53 phylogenetic inertia, developmental constraints, chance, and the possibility of
54 multiple solutions to the same adaptive problems are all at play in yielding
55 extant morphology, distributions of traits in populations, and biogeographical
56 distributions of species. At best, appeal to simplicity in this global sense is a
57 heuristic virtue, insofar as simpler hypotheses are perhaps easier to test, on a
58 some contruals of simplicity. But the parsimony of some thesis in this respect
59 does not lend it greater credibility. The global ontological thesis seems hardly
60 warranted in the case of biology. Sturteyvant is clearly unwarranted in taking
61 simplicity per se as a reason to prefer the chromosomal theory.
62 However, is this what Sturteyvant meant to say when he argued that the
63 chief virtue of the chromosomal theory its simplicity? In Sturteyvant’s view,
64 according to the alternative, ‘reduplication’ hypothesis:
65
66 We are forced to assume an enormously complex series of cell divisions,
67 many of them differential, proceeding with mathematical regularity and
68 precision, but in a manner for which direct observation furnishes no
69 basis. It seems to me that it is not desirable to assume such a complex
70 series of events unless we have extremely strong reasons for doing so. I
71 can see no sound reason for adopting the reduplication hypothesis. It
72 apparently rests on two discreditable hypotheses: somatic segregation, and
73 the occurrence of members of the 3:1, 7:1, 15:1, etc., series of gametic ratios
74 in more cases than would be expected from a chance distribution…
2 Twardy (personal communication) raises the question of whether simplicity and parsimony are
one and the same virtue. Though they are often used interchangably, my claim in this paper is that
parsimony, or rather, what scientists often mean by parsimony, is not simplicity, in the sense of
fewer parameters in one’s model or fewer mechanisms or processes invoked. So, I agree with
Twardy that the two virtues may be pulled apart.
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75
76 … the chief advantage of the chromosome hypothesis of linkage… seems
77 to be its simplicity. In addition, it appeals to a known mechanism… It
78 explains everything that any of the forms of the reduplication hypothesis
79 does and in addition offers a simple mechanical explanation for the fact
80 that ‘secondary series’ are always smaller than Trow’s special hypothesis
81 calls for them to be. On the reduplication hypothesis this fact must merely
82 be accepted, for, I think, it can not be explained (Sturteyvant, in Carlson
83 1966).
84 Once we examine Sturteyvant’s argument in closer detail, we can see that he
85 is not suggesting that we ought to prefer the chromosomal hypothesis solely on
86 the grounds that it has a greater economy of process. Moreover, the argument
87 does not appear so obviously misguided. Indeed, once one examines Sturtey-
88 vant’s reasoning behind the claim that the ‘simpler’ theory is preferable, the
89 argument begins to look quite persuasive. Sturteyvant claims, first, that on the
90 alternative view, we have to posit events that we have no independent evidence
91 for. Second, he claims that the alternative view ‘rests on’ or presupposes
92 hypotheses that are ‘discreditable.’ Third, his preferred chromosomal
93 hypothesis makes use of a mechanism whose operation is well understood.
94 Fourth and finally, there are phenomena that the alternative hypothesis cannot
95 explain and the chromosomal hypothesis can. Thus, in Sturteyvant’s view, we
96 ought to prefer the chromosomal hypothesis because it operates via a known
97 mechanism, does not presuppose questionable hypotheses, and can explain
98 phenomena that the alternative hypothesis leaves mysterious. In other words,
99 the chromosomal hypothesis is ‘simpler,’ by which he means, makes better
100 sense of the evidence to hand.
101 I wish to suggest that appeals to simplicity or parsimony in the biological
102 context are often shorthand for more elaborate and well-grounded rationales,
103 once one unpacks the argument carefully. This is the case in the paper by Coyne
104 et al. where they claim thatmass selection is amore parsimonious hypothesis than
105 Wright’s three phase shifting balance process. Thus, my interpretation is at odds
106 with that of Skipper, who argues (Skipper 2002) that we ought to interpret the
107 neo-Fisherian’s appeals to parsimony in the same vein as I originally interpreted
108 Sturteyvant above. In other words, Skipper argues that by ‘parsimony’, the neo-
109 Fisherians meant ‘economy of process.’ His summary of the neo-Fisherian po-
110 sition is as follows, ‘If the evolution of populations can be explained adequately
111 via a theory that postulates a small economy of entities and processes, there is no
112 need to invoke a theory with a larger economy of entities and processes’ (p. 360).
113 Skipper contends that this view is an instance of a naı¨ve appeal to parsimony, one
114 which sacrifices realism and precision for generality. The neo-Fisherians, he ar-
115 gues, ascribe to a ‘Newtonian’ ideal, according towhich there is one theory (what
116 Skipper calls Fisher’s ‘large size theory’), that explains all of the phenomena in
117 some domain. ‘However,’ Skipper warns us, ‘considerable care must be taken in
118 drawing a close connection between explanatory adequacy, generality, and
3
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119 parsimony because explanatory adequacy need not be so closely connected with
120 generality’ (p. 361).
121 I agree with Skipper that we should certainly take care in assuming that there is
122 a close connection between explanatory adequacy, generality and parsimony. In
123 other words, a more explanatory theory is not necessarily a more general one
124 (though, this will depend in part upon the request for explanation, or, the
125 pragmatic dimensions of the why-question). Moreover, I agree heartily with
126 Skipper that the theory which posits fewer mechanisms, entities, or processes
127 (however we count these), all else being equal, is not necessarily more likely to be
128 true. However, this is not what the neo-Fisherians were suggesting. Just as in the
129 case of the example of Sturteyvant’s argument for the chromosomal theory, once
130 we examine the neo-Fisherian’s appeal to parsimony more closely, it is not so
131 obviously misguided. In claiming that mass selection is ‘more parsimonious,’
132 Coyne et al. (1997) are claiming not that it is more general or more simple in the
133 sense of invoking fewer entities or processes. Rather, by ‘more parsimonious’
134 they mean that mass selection operates via a known mechanism which is
135 empirically well-established, does not depend upon presuppositions that are
136 questionable, and finally, that the evidence tells against the alternative hypoth-
137 esized mechanism as operating very frequently.
138 Moreover, their argument is not that the Fisherian model is more explanatory
139 simply because it is more general. In those cases where theWrightian three phase
140 process is occurring, the Wrightian model would certainly be the best explana-
141 tion. However, they claim that there are good empirical and theoretical grounds
142 for these cases being rather rare. And thus, we should expect more requests for
143 explanation of this or that adaptation to be satisfied by the Fisherian model. In
144 other words, it does not explain more because it is more general; rather it is more
145 general because it explains more.
146 Before I defend this thesis, Iwish tomake clearwhat I amnot attempting in this
147 paper. My aim is not to provide an overview of the debate between the neo-
148 Wrightians and the neo-Fisherians. Rather, my aim is to clarify what is meant by
149 ‘parsimony’ byCoyne et al. and in the process, to defend anaccount of parsimony
150 that takes it to be a genuinely epistemic, and not merely aesthetic or pragmatic
151 virtue. I take my cue from Sober, in a paper titled ‘Let’s Razor Ockham’s Razor’
152 (1990) and Reconstructing the Past (1988). He claims that by giving close atten-
153 tion the specific context inwhich appeals to parsimonyaremade by scientists, one
154 may come to understand that these appeals may sometimes be understood as
155 appeals to either higher prior probabilities or higher likelihood. Sober’s model
156 for unpacking appeals to simplicity employs Bayes’ Theorem.3
3 The model is ‘Bayesian’ in the sense that it uses Bayes’ theorem, an uncontroversial theorem in the
probability calculus. It does not commit one to a particular view on reconditionialization, sub-
jective probabilities, etc.. I.e., one does not need to subscribe to Bayesianism (whatever that means;
reasonable people disagree) in order see why Bayes’s rule is a useful way to elucidate scientific
inference in cases such as these involving competing hypotheses. I wish to emphasize that I am not
committed here to any theses about whether or not probabilities are best understood as degrees of
belief.
4
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157 Fisher vs. Wright
158 R.A. Fisher and Sewall Wright were two theoretical population geneticists
159 working in the early twentieth century who placed different emphasis on dif-
160 ferent factors in the evolutionary process. According to Wright, selection alone
161 is not sufficient to generate adaptive novelty. By ‘novelty’ here, I mean to
162 emphasize that according to Wright, selection alone could not suffice for major
163 adaptive changes due to radical changes in the genetic constitution of a pop-
164 ulation. Wright did not deny that selection could yield adaptative evolution.
165 However, he thought that there must be a ‘balance’ of ‘forces’ at play in
166 evolution (selection, drift, etc.), or a population would eventually become
167 ‘stuck’ atop adaptive peaks. This is because selection acts on genes in combi-
168 nation, and, according to Wright, there is pervasive epistasis for fitness (or,
169 breaking up such gene combinations may be maladaptive). Unless a population
170 is subdivided, novel adaptive gene combinations will not come about, and
171 populations of organisms may become ‘stuck’ atop suboptimal peaks in the
172 ‘adaptive landscape.’
173 The adaptive landscape is a model of the relative fitness of different gene
174 combinations, with the horizontal axes representing different genotypes, and
175 the vertical axis representing relative fitness. For Wright, the problem of how
176 to move from suboptimal to higher ‘adaptive peaks’ in the field of gene com-
177 binations was the key problem that theoretical biologists must solve, for the
178 reasons I stated above. Wright wrote, ‘The problem of evolution as I see it is
179 that of a mechanism by which the species may continually find its way from
180 lower to higher peaks in such a field’ (1932). In other words, Wright’s question
181 was, ‘How could one shift from one ‘‘balanced’’ gene combination to another,
182 across what must be deep valleys of low fitness?’ According to Wright, the most
183 effective means of traversing such peaks is via a three phase ‘shifting balance’
184 process of isolation of small subpopulations, intrademic (within group) and
185 interdemic (between group) selection. Wright believed this three phase process
186 to be the main means of generating adaptation, and perhaps also, many cases
187 of speciation.
188 If the reader has already begun to worry about the epistemic or ontological
189 status of adaptive landscapes, then she (or he) is not alone. Indeed, there has
190 been a flurry of papers in the evolution literature recently about the status and
191 shape of the ‘adaptive landscape.’4 Philosophers like Ruse (1993) have ex-
192 pressed skepticism about the way in which the adaptive landscape metaphor
193 misleads scientists. Fisher (letter to Wright, in Provine 1986 nAu: AQ: Citation
194 Provine (1986) is not in list please add to list.n) was one of the first to raise
195 concerns about the landscape. Was it indeed three dimensional? Or, as we
196 consider a greater and greater number of genes in combination, could the
197 landscape that describes relative fitness of different genotypes become multi-
198 dimensional? Is the landscape ‘rugged’ in the way Wright suggested? Arethe
4 See especially, Gavrilets (1996, 1997).
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199 ‘peaks’ static, or could there be ‘ridges’ arising between peaks over time, either
200 due to assortative mating, or changes in the environment, such that epistasis
201 for fitness is not necessarily a barrier to adaptive evolution and genuine evo-
202 lutionary novelty? These are exactly the worries that Coyne et al. the modern
203 neo-Fisherians have raised. Some might argue that one is stacking the deck
204 against Wright by arguing that by adopting the adaptive landscape metaphor,
205 his model makes presuppositions which are questionable. Surely we should first
206 look at the empirical evidence for or against those presuppositions? Indeed,
207 this is what Coyne et al. (1997) do at length.
208 As mentioned above, Fisher did not agree with Wright’s presuppositions
209 about either the extent of genetic epistasis for fitness, nor the metaphorical
210 adaptive landscape which depends upon this assumption. Fisher suspected that
211 the landscape was not three dimensional, but rather multidimensional, such
212 that adaptive evolution could occur along any of several trajectories of gene
213 frequency change. Epistasis, according to Fisher, was not so pervasive that
214 populations must become ‘stuck’ atop adaptive peaks. Moreover, Fisher
215 pointed out that while populations may well be structured in nature, migration
216 every generation between groups makes questionable the effectiveness of drift
217 as a way isolating novel gene combinations and thus of ‘peak-shifting’. This is
218 not to say that Fisher thought that drift did not operate in evolution. Rather,
219 Fisher thought it unlikely that drift played an important role in adaptive
220 evolution. Fisher also infamously believed that one could treat effective pop-
221 ulation size as the entire breeding population, which he assumed to be quite
222 large (on the order of infinity!). And since selection is more effective than drift
223 in populations of large size (where 4Ns > 1 (N = population size,
224 s = selection coefficient), selection must be the main factor in adaptive evo-
225 lution.
226 In 1997, Coyne et al. assessed the empirical and theoretical support for the
227 Wrightian vs. Fisherian model in the journal Evolution. They concluded that
228 there was relatively little evidence that Wright’s particular three-phase process
229 plays a significant role in the evolution of adaptations. They were not
230 questioning the fact of Wright’s influence and contributions, or that one or
231 another phase of the process might be important in adaptive change (e.g.
232 group selection), only that the three phase shifting balance process in par-
233 ticular was a major mode of adaptive change. Moreover, they were not
234 suggesting (with Fisher), that the effective population size of most popula-
235 tions was the entire breeding population, or that this was on the order of
236 infinity. Rather, they drew the more modest conclusion that selection ought
237 to be preferred as the more ‘parsimonious’ explanation for adaptation over
238 the three phase shifting balance model. In reply, Wade and Goodnight defend
239 Wright, and attacked the neo-Fisherians for their naı¨ve commitment to
240 parsimony as a theoretical virtue. Lewontin has argued that biology is an
241 ‘epistemologists’ paradise’ exactly because of arguments of this sort; we have
242 two theories, both seemingly able to account for the same phenomena: which
243 do we choose?
6
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244 Parsimony: not what you thought it was
245 At first glance, it may seem plausible that when Coyne et al. claim that the
246 Fisherian view is more parsimonious, they mean that it has the greatest
247 economy of process. Fisher’s mass selection is ‘less complicated’ than Wright’s
248 three phase process because one mechanism (selection) is operating as opposed
249 to four or five, depending upon how you count (isolation, drift, intra- and
250 interdemic selection, migration). I wish to counter this interpretation. The view
251 that they defend is not that Fisher’s theory is preferable because it involves
252 fewer processes. Rather, it is that the Fisherian process has a higher prior and
253 likelihood than Wright’s three phase process. More specifically, their claim is
254 that given the body of evidence at hand, the chance of shifting balance playing
255 a significant role in adaptive evolution is low relative to the alternative, because
256 the conditions required for it to operate are not very likely to be met in nature.
257 In short, the neo-Fisherian model
258 *Operates via known mechanisms
259 *Does not depend on questionable presuppositions
260 [i.e. uses presuppositions we accord a higher prior, hence has a higher prior]
261 *Fits the data better than Wright.
262 [Hence higher likelihood.] In short, it has a higher likelihood and prior than
263 the alternative shifting balance theory.
264 The Bayesian way
265 In a (1990) essay, and again in his (1988) book, Elliot Sober gives careful
266 scrutiny to the notion of parsimony.5 Below, I will sketch Sober’s analysis of
267 parsimony and suggest that this is one useful way to understand what is meant
268 by ‘parsimony’ in the Fisher–Wright debate. As Sober himself points out, one
269 need not subscribe to Bayesianism in order to see the use of Bayes’s rule as one
270 way of making sense of how scientists revise their views.
271 First, some terminological distinctions. Sober points out that Bayes’s theo-
272 rem provides a useful way of characterizing the considerations that might affect
273 one’s assessment of a hypothesis’ plausibility. The theorem says that the con-
274 ditional probability of some hypothesis H (Pr(H/e)) is:
Prðe=HÞPrðHÞ=PrðeÞ
276 So, when comparing two hypotheses, H1 and H2, their posterior probability is
277 influenced by two factors: their priors and their likelihoods:
Or;PrðH1=eÞ > PrðH2=eÞ iff Prðe=H1ÞPrðH1Þ > Pðe=H2ÞPðH2Þ
279 What does all this mean?
5 Though, more recently, (Sober and Wilson 1998) Sober and Wilson demarcate several different
forms of appeal to parsimony by Williams (1966), nAu: AQ: Citation Williams (1966) is not in list
please add to list.n not all of which are epistemic.
7
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280 Pr(H1) is the prior probability of H. Pr(e/H1) is H1’s likelihood. What is
281 likelihood? For one theory to have a higher likelihood, roughly, the evidence
282 will be more likely obtain than on the alternative theory. Likelihood is not the
283 same, however, as explanatory power. For example, if H1 is ‘rain tomorrow’
284 and e is ‘today’s barometric reading is 29 torr,’ then, H1 would have a high
285 likelihood relative to the evidence, but it would not explain the evidence.
286 One way of thinking about what scientists do when they’re assessing the
287 explanatoriness of two competing hypotheses is that they’re evaluating their
288 relative likelihoods, and/or antecedent plausibility. According to Sober, the
289 appeal to parsimony in such contexts are not necessarily appeals to greater
290 economy of process (though he does not rule out that they could be, given
291 certain background assumptions and in certain contexts). Philosophers, he
292 says, have ‘hypostatized’ parsimony. In other words, they have assumed that
293 appeals to parsimony mean the same thing in every context. Instead, he sug-
294 gests that when a scientist appeals to parsimony, his or her appeal has a distinct
295 meaning relative to a specific context and specific background assumptions.
296 Appeals to parsimony may thus be appeals to a theory’s greater plausibility,
297 given either its greater likelihood, and prior probability, or a combination of
298 both. In his words, ‘parsimony is a virtue that does not speak its name.’ So,
299 appeals to parsimony in the assessment of competing hypotheses, may in fact
300 be appeals to something ‘more fundamental’ – namely, the greater likelihood,
301 or prior probability of some theory, relative to the evidence and our back-
302 ground beliefs. There is no reason to adopt Occam’s razor, in the sense of
303 ‘fewest entities and/or processes’ as a general principle for all of science all of
304 the time. Rather, the nature and relevance of considerations of parsimony are
305 context dependent. In Sober’s terms, parsimony is not a ‘global,’ but a ‘local,’
306 virtue of theories.
307 Sober’s argument for this claim comes in two stages. First, he notes that if we
308 understand hypothesis evaluation using Bayesian framework, appeals to par-
309 simony make better sense of these arguments if we understand them in terms of
310 likelihoods and priors. Second, he argues that several cases of scientist’s appeal
311 to parsimony are best interpreted in this way. Let’s consider an example Sober
312 uses to illustrate his point. Williams argued that Wright’s three phase shifting
313 balance process is not very likely; he then extends this argument to argue that
314 group-level selection in general is unlikely (1966, pp. 111–117).
315 Sober rationally reconstructs Williams’ argument along Bayesian lines.6 Let
316 us designate group level selection hypotheses as HG, and individual level
317 selection hypotheses as HI. First, Williams concedes that the phenomena (say,
318 a herd of fleet deer) could be equally well be a product of group-level selection
319 as individual-level selection. I.e. they have equal likelihoods.
6 As my purposes here are expository, it is not relevant to this discussion whether Sober’s recon-
struction is faithful to the text. Indeed, Williams offers at least three (Sober and Wilson 1998)
different rationales for the greater parsimony of lower-level selection hypotheses. The argument
that moves from a critique of Wright’s model to a critique of group selection is only one of several.
8
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Prðe=HG) ¼ Pðe=HI)
321 What he must mean, according to Sober, when he claims that lower level
322 selection hypotheses are more parsimonious is that they have different priors,
323 or Pr(HG/e) < Pr(HI/e).
324 Williams argues that group selection requires a number of restrictive
325 assumptions about population structure: there must be sufficient variation
326 among groups, and rates of colonization and extinction must be sufficiently
327 high. These facts, (which have since been contested) are the reasons he gives for
328 the claim that lower level selection hypotheses are more parsimonious. I.e. they
329 have higher priors, in light of the evidence concerning variation among groups
330 and rates of colonization. According to Sober, Williams is not arguing that
331 group selection never happens, he’s simply suggesting that it’s highly implau-
332 sible that it does. According to Williams, the conditions for the possibility of
333 group selection rarely hold, so:
Pr(HI=eÞ > Pr(HG=eÞ because Pr(HI > Pr(HG)
335 So, using the Bayesian framework, we can understand Williams’s claims for
336 the greater parsimoniousness of individual selection hypotheses as claims
337 about the prior probability of individual selection being higher; where, prior
338 probability here is simply understood as the probability, given our background
339 beliefs about what conditions obtain in nature and which conditions are
340 required for group vs. individual selection.
341 My (and Sober’s) point here is not that Williams was correct.7 Rather, the
342 point is that this is one way of reconstructing scientists’ appeals to parsimony
343 that does not make them appear to be simple-minded (some humor). Some-
344 times, of course, scientists make flawed arguments, and appeals to parsimony
345 can be ad hoc justifications. Several of Williams arguments do fall under this
346 category. However, his argument against Wright follows the same structure as
347 that above, and the very same rationale is offered by Coyne et al. except with
348 the advantage of 50 years of theoretical and empirical work on shifting bal-
349 ance. Ultimately, whether or not a theory is understood to be more or less
350 parsimonious may be understood as an argument over whether it has a higher
351 likelihood, or a higher prior probability, or a combination of the two. In this
352 case, the claim is simply that ‘prior probability’ is, in the Williams’ context, a
353 matter of plausibility of the conditions required for some process to occur. One
354 might argue that it is dangerous to introduce formal tools when they simply
355 cannot be defined suitably in these informal contexts, and that Sober does this
356 to his detriment. It would be better, the objection goes, if Sober admitted that
357 the Williams is not talking about probabilities per se but rather judgments of
358 plausibility or truth. However, this is to miss the point of the exercize. Sober’s
359 claim is not that in fact scientists assign quantitative values to prior proba-
7 Indeed, Sober has offered considerable argument to the contrary, see Sober and Wilson 1999.
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360 bilities to this or that hypothesis, or that they in fact conditionalize using a
361 Bayesian model. Rather, the point is that we may use a Bayesian framework to
362 unpack the reasoning at work in judgments regarding competing hypotheses.
363 And, if we do so, then appeals to parsimony do not seem to be merely matters
364 of subjective opinion. Instead, they are judgments of plausibility based upon
365 empirical data and background theory.
366 So, now let’s turn to an analysis of the neo-Fisherians’ argument and see
367 whether this approach to parsimony can be helpful. When Coyne et al. say that
368 Fisher’s theory is more parsimonious than Wright’s, what could they mean?
369 First, they say that the presuppositions that Wright makes about the problem
370 of adaptive evolution, those very ones which make shifting balance seem to
371 provide a solution, are false. Second, they argue that the conditions required
372 for all three phases in Wright’s three phase process to operate in conjunction
373 are not very often met in nature. Third, they claim that there is ample evidence
374 that selection has generated adaptation, and, the conditions required for it to
375 operate are not at all restrictive (All one requires is additive genetic variance,
376 which they claim is amply available, and where 4Ns > 1, selection must be the
377 main factor in adaptive evolution).
378 Coyne et al.’s parsimony argument is not that Fisher’s theory is preferable
379 insofar as it invokes fewer mechanisms or processes. Rather, it is that the
380 conditions required for the specific combination of mechanisms that makes
381 possible Wright’s model are unlikely to obtain. They are not suggesting that
382 populations are not often subdivided, that drift plays no role in evolution, or
383 that epistatic interactions between genes never occur. Rather, they are sug-
384 gesting that the specific ‘concatenation’ of isolation, drift, intra- and inter-
385 demic selection required by shifting balance does not often obtain, and so it is
386 unlikely that Wright’s model explains many (if any) adaptations in nature.
387 Coyne et al.’s argument is not simply an argument against the plausibility of
388 shifting balance. It is additionally a prudential argument. In other words, given
389 the implausibility of shifting balance, they claim that it is prudential to adopt
390 selection as our working hypothesis, should we come across some apparent
391 adaptation in our investigations. Ample empirical and theoretical evidence
392 exists in favor of selection, so there is no question that it occurs. In contrast,
393 while there is some evidence for at least two phases of Wright’s three-phase
394 process, the evidence in support of all three phases occurring in sequence is
395 rather slim, or so they claim.
396 In my view, this is an instance where Sober’s defense of a ‘local’ notion of
397 parsimony coincides with the actual practice of appeals to parsimony in the
398 sciences.8
8 Note Coyne’s comments (personal communication). He writes: I think you are correct in your
interpretation… We say several times, I believe, that the SBT requires the concatentaion of
improbable circumstances AND that it is also untestable in many cases.
10
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399 Why Wright might not have been right
400 Now, I’ll discuss briefly some of the key points of Coyne et al.’s argument, and
401 then turn to issues of prudence in choice of research program in conclusion.
402 Their argument comes in three stages: first, they question the presuppositions
403 that led Wright to formulate his model. According to Coyne et al. the problem
404 as posed by Wright, of finding a ‘trial and error’ mechanism ‘by which the
405 species may find its way from lower to higher peaks’ was confused. Second,
406 they argue that each stage of the Shifting Balance individually is implausible,
407 for both empirical and theoretical reasons. Third, they claim that the condi-
408 tions required for all three stages to follow one upon another are restrictive and
409 unlikely to hold in nature.
410 What was the purported problem that Wright set out to solve? Wright was
411 motivated to develop the shifting balance theory in reply to what he saw as a
412 serious problem for adaptive evolution: the problem of escaping highly
413 adaptive ‘peaks’ in the field of gene combinations. Wright had been a student
414 of Castle at the Bussey institute; where the research program was focused on
415 the inheritance of traits due to multiple genes in interaction. Most of his
416 graduate work and his first job for the USDA were concerned with the
417 inheritance of complex traits, such as coat color, or milk yield. So, Wright was
418 impressed with the fact that many traits were influenced by multiple genetic
419 factors. Moreover, he was impressed with biogeographical work that seemed to
420 show that the differences between species did not appear to be adaptive
421 (Provine 1985 nAu: AQ: Citation Provine (1985) is not in list please add to
422 list.n). He concluded from these observations that major transitions between
423 species could not possibly be the result of selection alone. The view that
424 selection alone was not sufficient to generate novel species is an old argument in
425 biology and one which found its way into textbooks popular at the time Wright
426 began his studies in biology (see, for instance, Kellogg 1903, one of the first
427 texts Wright read in his first courses in biology).
428 According to Wright, complex traits, in particular, adaptive traits, are most
429 likely the result of genes that are more or less fit in combination – i.e. that
430 there is pervasive epistasis for fitness. If there is pervasive epistasis for fitness,
431 then it is not possible for highly adaptive gene combinations to be broken up
432 without a population losing fitness. So, on this view, major adaptive changes
433 in a population require that a population traverse an ‘adaptive valley’ via
434 drift. Dobzhansky gives a vivid description of the adaptive landscape as
435 follows:
436
437 The field of gene combinations may, then, be visualized most simply in a
438 form of a topographical map, in which the contours symbolize the
439 adaptive values of various combinations. Groups of related combinations
440 of genes, which make the organisms that possess them able to occupy
441 certain ecological niches, are then, represented by the adaptive peaks
442 situated in different parts of the field. The unfavorable combinations of
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443 genes which make their carriers unfit to live in any existing environment
444 are represented by the ‘adaptive valleys’ which lie between the peaks
445 (Dobzhansky 1951, pp. 8–9 nAu: AQ: Citation Dobzhansky (1951) is not
446 in list please add to list.n).
447 According to Wright, it is necessary for a population’s complex of genes to
448 be altered by sampling, or drift, in order for it to move to a more highly
449 adapted state. Since adaptation is a product of genes in combination, ‘novel
450 gene combinations’ are necessary for novel adaptations. If simply under the
451 control of selection, a species will ultimately come to rest on a suboptimal
452 peak. Notice that the above argument is an inference from an number of
453 observations to a rather wide-ranging conclusion about adaptation and evo-
454 lution as a whole.
455 Here’s Wright’s statement of the problem that he sought to solve with the
456 shifting balance theory:
457
458 The problem of evolution as I see it is that of a mechanism by which the
459 species may continually find its way from lower to higher peaks. … in
460 order that this may occur, there must be some trial and error mechanism
461 on a grand scale by which the species may explore the regions sur-
462 rounding the small portion of the field which it occupies. To evolve, the
463 species must not be under the strict control of selection (Wright 1932, pp.
464 163–164 nAu: AQ: Citation Wright (1932) is not in list please add to
465 list.n).
466 Wright’s trial and error mechanism was drawn directly from the breeding
467 program of the Duchess Shorthorn cattle, which he spent five years studying at
468 the USDA. In order to improve the cattle stock, the following procedure was
469 employed:
470
471 The first step in any case should be selection of a vigorous foundation,
472 approaching as closely as possible to the desired type. With such a
473 foundation stock, one might practice the most intensive inbreeding in a
474 large number of distinct lines, knowing that most lines would inevitably
475 deteriorate greatly, but trusting that a few would be found in which
476 desirable qualities would become fixed, and in which the deterioration in
477 any vital respect would be so slight that they could be maintained suc-
478 cessfully. By crossing such lines which have withstood this acid test of
479 inbreeding, one might reasonably hope to recover more than the original
480 vigor and retain those characters which had been fixed… This method, an
481 alternation of intensive inbreeding with selection and crossbreeding of the
482 few successful lines must naturally be done on a large scale… It is an
483 important method and has some parallel in the general history of the
484 breeds. Many of the early breeders practiced [it]. (Wright (1923b) nAu:
485 AQ: Cited reference Wright (1923b) is not in list please add to list.n, in
486 Provine (1986), p. 46.)
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487 Here, in a 1923 discussion of cattle breeding, Wright gave a preliminary
488 statement of what would become his three phase ‘shifting balance’ model of
489 evolution:
490
491 Phase I: Genetic drift causes local populations to temporarily lose fitness,
492 shifting across adaptive valleys toward new, higher adaptive peaks.
493
494 Phase II: Selection within demes places them atop new peaks.
495
496 Phase III: Different adaptive peaks compete with one another, causing
497 fitter peaks to spread through the entire population. Or, migration out
498 from the most adaptive deme leads to the spread of the most adaptive.
499 In sum, given the pervasiveness of epistasis for fitness, which Wright wit-
500 nessed in his experimental and USDA work, if strictly under the control of
501 selection, a population could not make significant adaptive changes. (Note here
502 that he’s moving from the case of multi-genic traits in mammals to all traits in
503 all species.) So, in order to escape suboptimal gene combinations, a population
504 needs to be broken up into small subpopulations, which, after a period of
505 isolation (during which drift and intrademic selection enable a population to
506 ‘escape’ undesirable gene combinations), can then come into contact and
507 compete.
508 Coyne et al. question the problem of evolution as set by Wright. Or, they
509 question Wright’s rationale as to why one must invoke explanations other than
510 selection for adaptive evolution. Wright supposed that mass selection is too
511 slow to explain diversity, that mutation is insufficient as source of variation,
512 that cost of substitutions constrains the rate of adaptation, and that phenotypic
513 change involves the appearance of maladaptive intermediates. In other words,
514 he thought that the Darwinian paradigm, according to which selection acts in
515 relatively large, panmictic populations, with mutations as the ‘raw material’,
516 was not adequate to account for complex adaptations and the diversity of life.
517 Some new story needed to be told that will explain how it is possible that new,
518 more adaptive, gene combinations can come about.
519 Coyne et al. deny that all of these are legitimate worries. I’ll focus on the last
520 and one of the most longstanding objections: that phenotypic change involves
521 the appearance of maladaptive intermediates, since this is what fueled Wright’s
522 idea of the adaptive landscape, and what ultimately lead to his shifting balance
523 idea.
524 Wright’s claim is that given the extent of epistatic interaction for fitness, we
525 require some mechanism to explain how it is that a population can move from
526 one highly adapted gene combination to another more adaptive combination.
527 Crow (1990) nAu: AQ: Citation Crow (1990) is not in list please add to list.n
528 describes the situation using a simple haploid model as follows:
529
530 Suppose alleles a and b go well together, as do A and B, but A and b
531 and a and B do not. Suppose further that the AB combination is better
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532 than the ab. If a population has a high frequency of a and b alleles it
533 will not move to a state in which A and B are common, because to do
534 so will produce a large number of inferior Ab and aB recombinants. We
535 can think of this as a three-dimensional graph in which the two
536 abscissas are the frequencies of the Ab and Ba alleles and the ordinate
537 is the mean fitness of a population with this frequency combination.
538 The surface will be saddle shaped, with a low peak where ab is common
539 and a high one where AB is common. A population near the lower peak
540 cannot get to the higher one without crossing a valley of lower fitness.
541 (Crow 1990, p. 75)
542 Coyne et al. reply to this argument as follows. Wright imagines that the
543 adaptive landscape is static, or, that the mean fitness of a population will be
544 constant. However, there is good reason to think that this is false. First, a
545 population may shift into an adaptive valley for any number of reasons other
546 than drift – change in environment, for instance. A change in environment or a
547 mutational change could change the mean fitness of a population, such that a
548 population originally on a peak may come to rest on a valley, and simple
549 selection could pull it up to a new peak. Moreover, ‘ridges’ can arise between
550 adaptive peaks for one of several reasons. The fitness of a particular gene
551 combination changes due to its relative frequency in a population, or because
552 of the relative numbers of other individuals in the same environment. This
553 phenomenon, that the fitness of a particular trait can change because of the
554 relative frequency of individuals possessing this trait, is known as frequency
555 dependence. Thus, particular genotypic combinations are not necessarily
556 ‘stuck’ atop adaptive peaks. Indeed, phenomena like frequency dependence
557 challenge the whole idea of a three dimensional landscape. If different indi-
558 viduals are more or less fit relative to the number other kinds of individuals in
559 their cohort, then it does not make sense to speak of specific genotypes having
560 specific fixed fitnesses. Not only will the adaptive landscape will be constantly
561 changing because of the selection coefficient of some trait will change with
562 frequency dependence, but if we consider the many dimensions in which we can
563 measure an individual’s (or a population’s!) fitness, there are multiple ridges
564 that an individual (or population) may traverse via selection. So, Coyne et al.’s
565 first argument against Wright is that the problem of evolution as he describes it
566 is not the problem he imagined.
567 Their second line of attack is to suggest that individually and in combina-
568 tion, each phase of the shifting balance process is unlikely to occur in nature,
569 on both theoretical and empirical grounds. It is true that the chance of peak
570 shifting by drift increases with decrease in population size. However, the
571 chances of staying atop an adaptive peak for very small populations is very
572 small. In other words, the smaller one’s reserve of variation, or, what is the
573 same, the smaller the population size, the more likely that a population will
574 drift into a valley or simply die out than that it will drift toward the vicinity of a
575 new, more adaptive peak. This renders phase I implausible.
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576 Coyne et al. further point out that many processes besides drift that can
577 move populations to different peaks (phase II). As mentioned above, local
578 peaks could be converted to ridgesa, allowing adaptive advance by selection.
579 And, of course, every case of natural selection is just a case of phase II.
580 Second, with respect to Phase III: peak shifts may occur only in sparsely
581 populated parts of a species’ range (i.e. the subpopulations would have to be
582 so isolated as to have none or very little incoming variation); so it’s difficult
583 to see how novel peaks could spread, or, how more highly adapted groups
584 could come into competition with other groups. Third, with respect to
585 empirical evidence: they claim that for each example canvassed, phase I is
586 infrequent, and only one known case shows convincing evidence for phase
587 III. In sum, they suggest that theory shows that shifting balance can some-
588 times be an efficient mechanism in adaptive evolution, but only under
589 restrictive conditions. And, empirical evidence suggests that there are very
590 few cases, if any, where all three phases in sequence have actually occurred.
591 Fisherian mass selection process is thus, they claim, ‘‘more parsimonious’’
592 than the shifting balance process.
593 Conclusions
594 What scientists mean by parsimony will vary relative to context, and, these
595 different senses of parsimony can yield more or less epistemically sound
596 grounds for adopting one or another theory or research program. Further,
597 parsimony in the context of the Wright–Fisher debate is not greater simplicity
598 in the sense of economy of process.9 Rather, parsimony in this case amounts to
599 plausibility, in this case, there is substantial evidence that Wright’s presuppo-
600 sitions are false, and that his mechanism operates rarely in nature. In light of
601 this interpretation of parsimony, I think that we can understand why Coyne et
602 al. think we ought to be skeptical of the significance of shifting balance. They
603 are offering an argument from what one might call prudence. Or, perhaps
604 better, given the empirical evidence, we ought to be cautious as to whether
605 shifting balance has played an important role in the evolutionary process.
606 Caution or prudence are not words commonly used in scientific contexts; more
607 often, scientist will appeal to a vague notion such as ‘parsimony’, which
608 inevitably leads to confusion and conflation.
609 This is not to deny that there are many mechanisms at work in nature. The
610 claim is not that there is no population structure, drift, or epistatic interactions
611 between genes. All they are suggesting is that unless and until we are called
612 upon to do otherwise, it’s prudent to adopt the Fisherian model in attempting
9 Though, of course, it is an open question what exactly we mean by ‘economy of process’. Does the
more economical process contain fewest kinds, fewest new kinds, or simply the fewest number of
entities or processes? (Thanks to Marc Lange for this comment).
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613 to explain some adaptation. The authors of these papers agree that there are a
614 multiplicity of mechanisms at work in evolution. They agree that selection,
615 drift, epistasis, etc. are all important factors in the process of evolution. What
616 they disagree about is how often it is the case that one particular combination
617 of these mechanisms obtains: namely, Wright’s three phase shifting balance
618 process.
619 Were Coyne et al. conflating explanatory power, generality and parsimony?
620 No. Adopting Coyne et al.’s view does not require of us that we rule out drift,
621 epistasis, or population structure as important factors in explaining evolu-
622 tionary pattern or processes. We may still be pluralists about the many
623 mechanisms and processes at work in generating evolutionary change. All it
624 requires is being suspicious of one particular combination of these factors.
625 Coyne et al. are not suggesting that mass selection is a sufficient explanation for
626 adaptation, only that it is the a very likely candidate, barring evidence for
627 isolation, drift, etc.
628 A nice analogy to this suggestion comes from Mayr’s (and later, Sober’s)
629 discussion of the adapationist program. We can separate the question of
630 whether we ought to adopt adaptationism as a research program from the
631 question of whether natural selection is sufficient to explain any or all partic-
632 ular adaptations. Likewise, we may separate the question of whether we ought
633 to adopt a Wrightian research program from whether in fact Wright’s model
634 explains any particular adaptation. There may be good reasons to reject the
635 research program, but this is not to say that Wright’s three phase process never
636 occurs.
637 The kind of arguments I think that one might sensibly offer in support of
638 adopting a research program will be very different from those offered in support
639 of invoking a particular mechanism to explain some particular phenomena.
640 Plausibility arguments of the sort I’ve just discussed will figure in the former
641 discussions, but not in the latter. For any particular case, however, if the evidence
642 isn’t decisive, it’s not clear that we much adopt one or the other. People can
643 maintain two or three alternatives. Feynman has written that all the good
644 physicists he knew kept about 3 models in their head all the time, and interpreted
645 new evidence on each of them. Analogously, keeping in mind the roles of drift,
646 mutation,migration, and various forms of selection (frequency dependent, intra-
647 and inter-demic) is a good strategy. I think that we may consistently say that
648 Fisherianmass selection is an important explanation for adaptation,without also
649 committing ourselves to the view that mass selection is a sufficient explanation –
650 or, that it suffices to explain every particular adaptation.
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